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Do Metaphors Dream of Literal 
Sleep? A Science-Fictional Theory of 
Representation. By Seo- 
 
Young Chu  
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010. 316 pp. Cloth 
$39.95. 
 
Science fiction, wrote Darko Suvin in “On the Poetics of the Science 
Fiction Genre,” is “the literature of cognitive estrangement” the genre 
that arises out of the dialectical encounter between that which is real 
and that which is imagined, impossible or yet to be.1 The 
estrangements of science fiction defamiliarize our empirical, everyday 
reality, motivating through the depiction of radical difference a new 
and profound rerecognition of our surroundings; cognition acts as         
estrangement’s reality principle, tethering it to what is real, lest it lose 
all sense and become a mere flight of fancy. Science fiction in this way 
becomes in Suvin’s hands a literature not of anticipation but of 
analogy; science fiction does not predict the future but rather 
allegorizes what is already real in the present. 
This definition—which firmly situates science fiction as a genre 
of the political left, as both sub- and supragenre of utopia—remains at 
the center of science fiction studies nearly forty years after its first 
articulation, with new interventions in the field still typically beginning 
either with the acceptance of Suvin’s terms or else the positing of 
some alternative approach. In Do Metaphors Dream of Literal Sleep?, 
Seo-Young Chu sets out in precisely this way, provocatively 
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announcing her project as “Suvin’s definition turned inside out” (3). 
For Chu, science fiction is not an antirealist literature of the impossible 
but rather a mimesis of those alien things that exist despite their 
strangeness; science fiction describes those literary practices that seek 
to represent “cognitive estranging objects” that are real but only 
partially thinkable by the human mind—what Chu calls “objects of 
wonder” (5). Trauma, cyberspace, and globalization are three such 
objects, nonimaginary and partially measurable and yet, at the same 
time, elusive, excessive, and indistinct; each is the focus of a chapter 
of Chu’s book. 
Chu’s startling and ambitious project therefore seeks in the end 
to turn the existing tradition of science fiction studies on its head, in 
the process transmogrifying all genres of literature and thought into 
variations on science fiction. Surrealism becomes the science fictional 
mimesis of dreams; detective fiction is the science fictional mimesis of 
“the mystery of ratiocination” (9); supernatural fictions like Harry 
Potter or the Twilight series are the science fictional mimesis of the 
fierce, multiple subjectivities of young adulthood. Even the most 
baseline realist text—something like Balzac or Dickens—becomes, in 
Chu’s terms, “actually a ‘weak’ or low-intensity variety of science 
fiction, one that requires relatively little energy to accomplish its 
representational task insofar as its referents . . . are readily 
susceptible to representation” (7). All representation, after all, is to 
some extent or another predicated on the dialectic between 
cognition/referentiality and estrangement/fictionality; representation 
without cognition would be quite literally unthinkable, while 
representation without some level of estrangement would simply be 
the thing itself. Consequently, everything is science fiction, at least a 
little bit. 
The approach to science fictions (and to artistic and literary 
production more generally) laid out by Do Metaphors Dream of Literal 
Sleep? is in many ways tremendously exciting, especially in the book’s 
positioning of lyricism as the necessary “torque” required to “convert 
referents ordinarily averse to representation into referents accessible 
to representation” (67).Whereas most theorists of science fiction focus 
on the genre’s more prosaic characteristics, Chu reimagines science 
fiction as a long-lost cousin of poetry, with stunning insight. Chu’s 
fascinating epistemological approach likewise makes an important case 
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for the centrality of science fiction for both theories of literature and 
theories of the world as such. Because “to make something available 
for representation is to make it knowable” (75) science fiction becomes 
an ever-more necessary technology for knowledge in a fast-changing 
world like ours, where cognitively estranging objects and elusive 
referents proliferate by the day (81). 
Having established her method in the book’s lengthy and 
exceptional introduction, Chu turns in each of the five chapters to 
explicating her theory through readings of seminal science fiction 
works, drawn from Chu’s impressively encyclopedic knowledge of the 
genre. (The book’s inventive epilogue ultimately imagines these as 
only the thinnest sliver of the “much larger hypothetical book 
containing an infinite number of chapters that correspond to an infinite 
number of cognitively estranging objects and phenomena” [247].) 
Chapter 1, on globalization, is the book’s best, tracing globalization, 
itself a cognitively estranging object, through an extended application 
of Fredric Jameson’s strategy for cognitive mapping. Chu argues that 
science fiction literalizes the “time-space compression” that David 
Harvey notes characterizes postmodernity (94), and that this is 
precisely why “those who think and write about globalization have long 
been drawn to the language of science fiction” (88–89). Chapter 2 
similarly traces the creation and application of the idea of cyberspace, 
especially in the works of William Gibson; chapters 3 and 4 concern in 
different ways “the science-fictionalization of trauma,” first with 
respect to the cognitive excess of PTSD and shell shock and second 
with respect to the “postmemory” of diasporic Korean-American 
writers in the United States.  
But it is chapter 5, “titled Robot Rights,” that ultimately exposes 
important limits to Chu’s otherwise fruitful approach. Chu’s insistence 
on the mimetic dimension of science fiction—and  her explicit rejection 
of allegory as, perhaps, the only thing in the universe that isn’t science 
fiction (75)—leads  her to conclude that stories about robots must at 
their core be about the potential moral status of nonhuman and 
partially human artificial life. Indeed, she traces this strange claim as 
far back as Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), written in an era (then 
as now) when the creation of artificial persons was pure fantasy. 
Stories about robots are manifestly about nonexistent, imaginary 
referents—there are no such creatures anywhere. The real referents of 
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these stories are instead the tragically nonimaginary conditions of 
unjust discrimination and labor exploitation they unmistakably 
allegorize. Robot stories are indeed, as Chu writes, “increasingly 
important as a way of representing human rights,” but not (as she 
claims) because technology is outfitting more and more people with 
more and better technological prostheses—it is rather because 
imagining robots, aliens, and other inscrutable others has only ever 
been a allegorical way of confronting, and coming to terms with, the 
vast diversity within the human family. The referent for robot fictions 
is not robot consciousness, but our own. 
Indeed, despite her protests, most of Chu’s excellent work really 
amounts to Suvinian/Jamesonian allegory sailing under the flag of 
metaphor. Chu attempts to draw a proposed distinction between 
allegory and science fiction this way: 
 
<EXT>The purpose of allegory is not to refer to a specific object 
but to incite the reader’s mind to exegesis. Meanwhile, the 
purpose of science fiction is not to instigate exegetical activity in 
the reader’s mind but to represent a cognitively estranging 
referent. Just as a transitive verb requires an object to complete 
its meaning (“to represent ____,” “to address ____”) science 
fiction requires an object—or more precisely a referent—to 
complete its function. (76)</EXT> 
 
But to say, for instance, that science fiction represents trauma by 
literalizing the way it exceeds our cognitive ordering of temporal and 
spatial via such devices as time travel and out-of-body experiences 
(156) is exactly to say that science fiction allegorizes the experience of 
trauma. Such a representational act necessarily invites a critical 
exegesis; the reader is required to draw some interpretive connection 
between the artistic representation and its supposed referent or else 
the story would simply be fantastic nonsense. After all, the victim of 
trauma does not literally travel in time or out of her body, any more 
than the explorer of cyberspace literally manifests inside the 
computer, the globalized world literally manifests a world-soul, or 
literal robots make literal demands for moral recognition and equal 
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rights. Exegesis and interpretation remain fundamental to the science 
fictional representational strategy Chu calls “counterfigurative 
literalization” (68)—and the synaptic gap that connects cognitively 
estranging referents to their science fictional representations is 
precisely the gap of allegory itself. 
In this way, Chu does in fact turn Suvin inside out, in a much 
more direct sense than perhaps she realizes. Where Suvinian criticism 
has tended to focus on science fiction’s dimension of estrangement, 
taking the cognition as read, Chu puts estrangement to one side and 
focuses instead on the principle of cognition—on enumerating the 
nonimaginary, nonhypothetical referents that lend science fiction 
objects their undeniable “vivacity, solidity, persistence, and giveness” 
(68). But in the end we pass through Chu’s intriguing reversal of 
priorities and emerge again on the other side to find that the 
allegorical interpretive strategies suggested by the logic of 
estrangement are (still) the real key to the genre. The only alternative 
to allegory would be the category error Chu flirts with throughout Do 
Metaphors Dream of Literal Sleep?, before committing to it finally in 
the struggle for robot rights in  her chapter 5: mistaking science fiction 
for something other than a fiction, mistaking the map for the truth of 
the territory, mistaking the dream for something real. 
 
 
                                                                                Gerry Canavan  
                                                                        Marquette University 
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